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Japanese and U.S. company data in an attempt to assess the contribution of R&D to productivity in both countries.
This paper can be viewed as a continuation of our previous work on R&D and productivity growth at the firm level in the United States and in France. In analyzing the data for French and U.S. manufacturing we found that differences in R&D effort do not account for much of the observed difference in the average rate of productivity growth or its distribution across industrial sectors or firms (see Griliches and Mairesse 1983, 1984; Cuneo and Mairesse 1984) . The availability of similar data for Japan led us to extend these comparisons to that country and the United States, between which the contrasts are even larger.
Our work differs from much of the productivity-comparisons literature by taking the individual firm data as its primary focus. Firm data have the virtue of providing us with much more variance in the relevant variables and a more appropriate level of analysis, the level at which most of our theories are specified. By working with microlevel data we escape many of the aggregation problems that plague macroeconomics. On the other hand, these benefits do not come without cost. Our data bases rarely contain enough variables relevant to the specific circumstances of a particular firm, and the available variables themselves are subject to much higher relative error rates, which are largely averaged out in aggregate data.
The basic approach we follow in this paper is to compute simple productivity-growth measures for individual manufacturing firms both in Japan and the United States for the relatively recent 1973-80 period and relate them to differences in the intensity of R&D effort. We start by describing our data sources and the overall pattern of R&D spending in manufacturing in both countries and by reviewing the major trends in productivity growth across different industrial sectors. We then turn to the discussion of regression results that attempt to account for the differences in labor productivity growth by the differences in the growth of the capital-labor ratio and in the intensity of R&D effort across different firms for total manufacturing as a whole and also separately within specific industrial sectors.
Since, as we shall point out in some detail later on, the Japanese R&D data at the firm level turn out to be especially incomplete, we cannot provide a solution to the original puzzle of differential growth rates, but we still have some interesting facts and several new puzzles to report.
Comparing R&D Expenditures
Before we look at our R&D data at the firm level, it is useful to compare the industrial distribution of R&D expenditures in both countries. Tables 8.1 and use the same Japanese data base to construct value-added-based TFP growth measures and relate them to firm R&D intensities. Their results for Japan are similar to ours but they make no crosscountry comparisons. Source: Report on the Survey of Research and Development (Prime Minister's Office 1976) . Note: "Manufacturing" excludes petroleum refining. "Total R&D/total sales (not average of firm ratios).
T h e numbers in the first three columns are percentages and add up to 100. 8.2 show comparative statistics on the magnitude and industrial distribution of R&D expenditures for manufacturing in both countries, focusing on the role of "large" firms (firms with more than 1,000 employee^).^ We look primarily at large firms because they account for most of the R&D in either country and also because these are the firms represented in our microdata sets.
Comparing the two tables we can see that large firms are more numerous in the United States, and that, on average, they are also larger (about 10,000 employees per firm versus 3,500 in Japan). Large firms account for 70% of total sales and 65% of total employment in manufacturing in the United States versus 52% and 41%, respectively, in Japan. Similarly, large firms do almost all of the R&D in the United States--94%-but only about three-quarters in Japan.4
Allowing for differences in the size of the countries and the size distribution of firms, there is very little difference either in the intensity or the sectoral distribution of company-financed R&D expenditures in the two countries. There is a big difference, however, in the involvement of government in the financing of R&D performed in manufacturing. In the United States, over a third of total R&D has been federally financed while in Japan the state accounts for less than 2% of the total.5 Since our microdata reflect only company financed R&D we shall not be able to discuss the role of public R&D support in this context.6
While, in absolute terms, large Japanese manufacturing companies spend only about a third as much on R&D as U.S. companies do, the relation of these expenditures to sales is remarkably similar (about 2%) in both countries. The distribution of total company R&D by industry and of the intensity of R&D effort are also very similar in the two countries. Most of the R&D is done in three sectors: electrical equipment, transportation equipment, and chemical industries.' The highest R&D to sales ratios are to be found in the drug and electrical equipment industries, the only noticeable difference being the somewhat higher relative R&D expenditure in the U.S. instruments industry. countries the responses to official R&D surveys are confidential and not publicly available. However, information on individual firms' R&D expenditures is available in their public annual reports or their filings with the respective securities markets regulatory authorities (10K statements in the United States).
In Japan such data are collected and organized by the Nihon Keizai Shimbun Corporation and are known as the NEEDS data base. In the United States, the equivalent is Standard and Poor's Annual Industrial Compustat.
We have worked previously with the Compustat data and have created a consistent panel data set based on it.8 This is, however, our first experience with the NEEDS data, and we had to invest heavily in cleaning them and in trying to understand their construction and provenance. Except for the R&D numbers, as we shall see below, these data seem of comparable quality to the Compustat data for the United States.
The general characteristics of the parallel firm samples that we have constructed are depicted in table 8.3. If we insist on continuous data from 1972 through 1980 with no major mergers or major jumps in the series and require also consistent reporting of R&D expenditures throughout this period, we have complete data for about 400 R&D firms in Japan and slightly over 500 R&D firms in the United state^.^ The U.S. firms are significantly larger, by a factor of four on average. They also seem to be doing much more R&D, even relatively. Here we stumble on our major difficulty with the NEEDS data. The R&D data appear to be badly underreported in this source. If we compare the numbers in table 8.1 with those in table 8.2, we observe that the overall company financed R&D to sales ratio is roughly similar in both countries and only slightly lower in Japan (1.91% vs. 2.3% in the United States for large R&Dperforming firms), while the numbers in table 8.3 imply that the U.S. firms are twice as R&D intensive.
It does not take very long to convince oneself that indeed the NEEDS data are heavily deficient in their R&D coverage. Table 8 .4 reports coverage ratios for 1981 of the NEEDS R&D numbers relative to the official Japanese R&D survey. While the large firms in the NEEDS sample account for close to 80% of the relevant employment and sales totals, the coverage of R&D expenditures is only slightly above one-third.'O Looking at the distribution by industrial sec-8. See Bound, Cummins, Griliches, Hall, and Jaffe (1984) and Hall, C u m i n s , Laderman, and Mundy (1988) for a discussion of the construction and description of this data set, which includes also a match to the Patent Office data on the number of patents granted to these firms.
9. If we do not require consistent reporting of R&D expenditures we have samples of about 1,OOO manufacturing firms in each country. Because of the significant and intermittent nonreporting of R&D one cannot assume that the other firms (the ones not included) are truly "zero-R&D' firms. Thus one cannot separate our samples cleanly into R&D and non-R&D firms and compare the results. This has only been possible in a study for France, because it was conducted within the National Institute of Statistics and we had access to the individual data of the French R&D survey (see Mairesse and Cuneo 1985) .
10. The coverage ratios in table 8.4 are for the most recent year that we had data for in both the NEEDS and R&D surveys (1981) but they are not much different in the earlier years. There has been little improvement in R&D reporting in the NEEDS data base. The coverage ratios for the "From the NEEDS (Nihon Keizai Shimbun) data base. Converted to dollars at $1 = Y300. addition to the 394 continuously R&D-reporting firms in the Japanese sample, there are also 338 firms that reported nonzero R&D expenditures in one or more years in the 1972-80 period. 'The data on largest R&D-performing firms in Japan reported in OECD (1984) were used to fill in some missing values and adjust others for apparent underreporting.
addition to the 525 continuously R&D-reporting firms in the U.S. sample, with no major jumps, there are also 129 firms that reported nonzero R&D expenditures in one or more years in the 1972-80 period. 'Average of individual firm R&D to sales ratios.
tor we see that coverage varies from good to reasonable for the chemical, drug, and instruments industries, but that it is abysmal for motor vehicles and transportation equipment and poor for the rest of manufacturing. The magnitude of the problem can be appreciated when it is realized that neither Toyota, Hitachi, Nissan, nor Honda report positive R&D expenditures in the NEEDS data base.
Using information published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD 1984) on the 20 largest R&D performers in Japan in 1979, we find that of the 18 firms that should be within our definition of manufacturing and are indeed in the NEEDS file, 10 report no R&D whatsoever, 3 report about the same amount of R&D in both sources, and, what may be even more worrisome, 5 companies report significantly less R&D in the NEEDS data base than is reported by the OECD. For example, the reported R&D expenditures of the Sony Corporation differ by a factor of two. If the OECD information is added to the NEEDS data set, total R&D expenditures come close to doubling, and the coverage ratio rises to a respectable 73%.
Thus the problem we face is not only that R&D is missing for some firms, large firms were 30% and 35% in 1976 and 1981, respectively. F m s that do report their R&D in the NEEDS data base do so continuously and apparently on a consistent basis. a problem that we could either ignore or adjust for in some way, but also that the reported figures themselves appear to be inaccurate. They reflect not only real differences in this variable but also differences in reporting practices.
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Since there was nothing else that we could do at this point, we complemented or adjusted the R&D figures for the 18 very large R&D firms for which we had OECD information and proceeded to analyze these data as if they actually mean what they say. The best we can hope for is that the reported R&D numbers are still acceptable proxies for the true figures.I' We will come back, however, to this issue in interpreting the results of our analyses.
A few words should be said at this point about the U.S. R&D data. They indeed seem better. Even though they are not exactly conceptually equivalent, the l0K-based reports and the NSF-collected (National Science Foundation, various issues) numbers are not very far apart, especially as far as industry totals are concerned. A recent analysis by the NSF (1985) of data for the 200 largest R&D performers finds the totals in 1981 remarkably close (within 3%), though this covers up significant individual variability. Forty-seven percent of the firms reported totals within 10% in both sources; 22% were within 10% to 25% and only 13% were off by more than 25%. Eighteen percent were not included in the Compustat-based data base, primarily because they were either 11. Even if the total R&D levels are about right (after correction) and comparable in the two countries, if the individual observations are subject to much error and different reporting practices (especially for the smaller R&D performers), our subsequent regression-based estimates of the "importance" of R&D may be significantly biased downward. Actually, however, adjusting the R&D data for the 18 large R&D-performing firms, using the OECD (1984) information, had very little effect on our regression estimates. privately or foreign owned. Using 1976 totals and adjusting for differences in definition and coverage, we ourselves estimated that the Compustat-based universe contained about 85% of total R&D reported to the NSF, with the major discrepancy arising from the above mentioned absence of privately and foreign owned firms in these data.I2 At the same time, our selection of "continuous R&D' firms preserves about 80% of the total R&D reported in the 1976 large Compustat cross section. Thus, roughly speaking, the firms contained in our U.S. sample account for about 70% of the total company financed R&D as reported to the National Science Foundation.
Comparing Trends in Productivity Growth
Bearing in mind the limitations of the R&D data, we look now at the productivity record of the firms in our samples for both countries during the 1970s. Tables 8.5 and 8.6 list the sample sizes, averages, and standard deviations for some of our major variables by industrial sector and for manufacturing as a whole. The construction of the major variables is similar for both countries except that in the United States we were able to use 3-digit SIC-level price deflators and business segment information to construct individual firm sales deflators, while for Japan we had to use general 2-digit level deflator^.'^ In both countries the gross plant figures were converted from historical to constant prices using the information contained in the net versus gross plant dis-tin~tion.'~ In neither data set do we have information on hours worked, and materials purchases are available only for Japan.
There are a number of interesting observations to be made on the basis of tables 8.5 and 8.6, some less obvious than others. The major contrast between the two countries is in the employment story and the associated productivity movements. In Japan, total employment declined in eight out of the nine industrial groupings, whereas, in the United States, it rose in all sectors. In fact, real output per firm as measured by deflated sales grew at about the same rate in the United States as in Japan, 3.5% per year on average, with the big difference in the productivity numbers coming essentially from the behavior of the employment series.
The same thing is also true for the growth in the capital-labor ratio, which grew twice as fast in Japan as in the United States, while the capital stock was growing at roughly similar rates in both countries during this same period (about 6.4% per year). It is also interesting to note that in both countries the 12. See Bound et al. (1984) for more detail. 13. The 2-digit deflators for Japan are taken from the Prices Indices Annual issues (Bank of Japan, various years). In previous work, we were able to verify that using 2-digit deflators, instead of more detailed ones, in the case of the United States had very little effect on the regression estimates.
14. See the appendix of Griliches and Mairesse (1984) for more detail on the adjustment of the gross plant numbers for inflation. Using alternative measures for physical capital had little effect on our results. growth of the capital-labor ratio was very similar for the different industrial groupings, varying much less than the growth in the output-labor ratio. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the ratio of real wages to capital user costs moved differently between the two countries but essentially similarly for the different industries within these countries. If one estimates total factor productivity growth by assuming that value added and sales vary proportionately and that the capital input weight in value added is constant and equal to 0.25 for all firms in both countries, one finds several commonalities and also some contrasts. In both countries the high R&D industries split in their productivity experience: electric equipment and instruments have the highest productivity growth rates while chemicals are among the lowest ones. The major contrasts occur in the machinery, transportation equipment, and drug industries, where there was significant productivity growth in Japan but not in the United States.I5 Only in the food industry did the United States do better than Japan as far as total factor productivity growth is concerned.
Our numbers are not strictly comparable to similar macroestimates, both because they are unweighted firm averages and because many of the firms in our two samples are multinationals with neither their employment nor productivity restricted entirely to the country of origin. Nevertheless, table 8.7 presents the figures on average growth rates of labor and labor productivity that we have gathered at the industry level and for manufacturing as a whole in the two countries, and the corresponding measures from our two total samples.16 There is no striking inconsistency in the two sets of micro-and macroestimates, but rather a rough agreement in terms of the pattern of differences both across industries and countries. For example, productivity growth is clearly the highest for electrical equipment in the two countries and about the lowest for metals; it is also the case that transportation equipment did quite well in Japan contrary to the United States.17 It is interesting to note, however, that the overall growth in productivity tends to be more rapid for the firms in our samples than for manufacturing as a whole (the differential being as much as 1.7% per year in Japan and 0.8% in the United States), while the contrast in employment experience is even larger: 2.5% slower growth in our firm data in Japan versus the United States, as against only a 0.8% differential in the national-incomeaccounts-based industry totals.
15. Using a more appropriate price deflator for the drug companies in Japan than one used for the chemical industry as a whole (which was done in an earlier version of the paper) results in a significant rise in their estimated productivity growth, but it has no effect on regression results that allow for separate industry constants.
16. The macroestimates for Japan are taken from the Annual Reports on National Income Statistics. Those for the United States are constructed from output series based on the Survey of Manufactures and from the price indices used in National Accounts-see Griliches and Lichtenberg (1984) for details. Note that table 8.6 is based on total samples, not just the R&D firms. A comparison of tables 8.5 and 8.6 with 8.7 shows only minor differences between our total sample and the R&D firms subsample.
17. Our numbers are also consistent with the macroevidence given in Jorgenson, Kuroda, and Nishimizu (1987) . 
R&D Intensity and Productivity Growth at the Firm Level
The model we consider can be thought of as a modified version of the Cobb-Douglas production function in its growth rate form, with labor productivity being a function of the physical capital-labor ratio and research capital.I8 Because we have only a very short history of research expenditures for most of these firms, it is difficult to construct a reliable research capital measure. We use, therefore, the R&D intensity version of this model instead, in which the beginning period R&D to sales ratio is substituted for the unavailable R&D capital variable.
Let the true equation be The research capital elasticity y is equal, by definition, to (dQ/dK)(K/Q). Since k = dK/K, we can simplify yk = (dQ/dK)(K/Q)(dK/K) to p(R/Q), where p = dQ/dK is the marginal product of research capital and R is the level of R&D expenditures. "ivo points need to be made about this type of simplification: it assumes that R, gross expenditures on R&D, is a good proxy for net investment (dK) in R&D capital. This can be true only if there is no or little depreciation of research capital or if we are in the beginning phases of accumulation and the initial stocks of K are small. Also, it is assumed that p rather than y is constant across firms, that the rate of return p is the parameter that is more likely to be equalized across finns.19
The equations that we estimate are then of the form
where the rates of growth of (q -I), (c -E), are generally computed over the seven-year period 1973-80. 18 . A number of issues are ignored in such a framework, not because they are unimportant, but primarily because there is little that we can do about them here. For example, much of the Japanese progress may be based on imported technology, for which we have no data. However, to the extent that R&D expenditures are required to absorb borrowed or imported technology, this may still be captured, in part, by our measures. We can also do little about the role of government R&D support (there are no data on this at the firm level in either data base) or spillovers in this context (see Griliches 1979 for a discussion of these and other caveats).
19. See Griliches (1979) and Griliches and Lichtenberg (1984) for a related discussion of such models.
The adoption of this specification has two important consequences: first, the estimating equation is expressed in terms of rates of growth of productivity (first differences of the logarithms of the various variables) and thus does not relate differences in productivity levels to differences in R&D capital. This has the advantage of protecting the estimates from potential biases due to (correlated) specific effects but at the cost of ignoring the large variability of the data in the cross-sectional dimension. We know from previous work that results based on this dimension (between-firms) are usually stronger than those based only on the time dimension (within-firms) (see, e.g., Griliches and Mairesse [1984] and Cuneo and Mairesse [1984] ). A second consequence is that we relate differences in the rate of growth of productivity to differences in R&D to sales ratios (rather than to the differences in the rate of growth of R&D capital stock).zo Several alternative measures of R&D intensity, R/Q, were tried with largely similar results. The final variable chosen, ARB, relates the average amount of deflated R&D during 1972-74 to the mean (geometric) levels of deflated sales for the period as a whole (average of 1973 and 1980 sales). The numerator of this ratio refers to the beginning of the period and allows, implicitly, for an approximate three-year lag in the effects of R~C D .~'
The denominator is positioned in the middle of the period to reduce the spuriousness that may arise when a growth rate is based on a ratio whose denominator is in fact the initial level from which the growth rate is measured.22 Instead of a unique trend term we include, usually, separate industry dummy variables, which allow for differential industrial trends of disembodied technical change, and also for deflator errors and industrywide changes in capacity utilization. Such equations were also estimated separately for each industrial grouping.
20.
There are several difficulties in interpreting the estimated coefficient of R&D intensity, p. as the marginal product of or rate of return to R&D. The exact meaning of the estimated p depends on the measure of R&D intensity, the measure of output, and what else is included in the equation. Since we use an R&D to sales ratio, p should be interpreted as a gross marginal product in terms of output. But leaving material inputs out of the equation brings it closer to a value-added interpretation, which would presumably have resulted in a lower coefficient if value added were substituted for sales in the denominator. On the other hand, leaving out the "depreciation" of the existing R&D capital stock would bias the estimated coefficient downward (on the order of a half). It is also the case that the estimated p may be affected by the fact that R&D labor and R&D capital are counted twice, once in the available measures of labor and physical capital and again in the measure of R&D. Hence p might be viewed as an excess marginal product or rate of return (above the usual remuneration). Such an interpretation must be qualified however, since it does not apply easily to estimates in the time dimension (see Griliches 1979; Schankerman 1981; Griliches and Lichtenberg 1984; and Cuneo and Mairesse 1984 on these matters). Thus the estimated p coefficients are only very distant reflections of the relevant "rate of return" concept. 21. We also tried shorter lags, i.e., by defining the R&D measure as of 1976 (the middle of our period) but this produced significantly worse results in both Japan and the United States. We could not really try for longer lags within the framework of our data bases.
22. Using sales in 1973 or an average of 1972 and 1974 sales as a base does indeed make our results look significantly better. Using the RE73 (estimated) ratio (i.e., 2R73/[S72 + S741) in eq. 5 of table 8.8, for example, we get for its coefficient .36 with a r-ratio of 2.6 in Japan and .42 with a t-ratio of 5.5 in the United States. These are significantly higher than the comparable numbers in table 8.8. Since the R&D numerator is the same in both measures, this does imply that our womes about potential spuriousness may not be groundless. Table 8 .8 summarizes our main econometric results. The estimated R&D coefficients in the productivity growth equations are of similar magnitude in both countries. They fall substantially when industry dummies (trends) are allowed for, implying, possibly, the presence of significant interfirm R&D spillovers. The major difference is that, in this case, the coefficients for Japan are not statistically significant at conventional significance levels.
Although significant, the contribution of R&D intensity to the explanation of the variance in productivity growth across firms is rather small, the fit barely improving in the second decimal place. Nor can R&D account for the mean difference in growth rates between the two countries. Both the average R&D intensities and the estimated coefficients are quite close to each other. Nevertheless, if these coefficients are taken at face value, they imply that R&D contributed between 0.4% and 0.6% per year to productivity growth in both countries. This is not a small matter after all.
What is most striking in our results is the lower estimated contribution of physical capital to output growth in the United States. It is about half of what is estimated for Japan.23 In fact, if we apply the coefficients in table 8.8 (regression 3) to the first row of table 8.5, we can account for about half of the Japan-United States difference in productivity growth by (1) the twice-as-fast rate of growth of the capital-labor ratio in Japan, and (2) its twice-as-large effect on productivity there. The reasons for both of these findings remain to be elucidated.
On the other hand, the Japanese data seem also to imply a much sharper rate of diminishing returns. This last estimate (the -.24 coefficient in regression 5) seems rather difficult to believe; it could be due to errors in the Japanese labor variable or to our inability to properly account for the problem of varying capacity utilization and hours of work. In any case, since the Japanese firms reduced their average employment during this period, such "diminishing returns" could not serve as a brake on their productivity growth. Table 8 .9 summarizes our attempts to look at the same issues at the individual industry level. Given the high error rates in the data at the firm level and the relatively small sample sizes, there is little to be seen here. Consistent with our earlier finding that the overall R&D coefficient was not statistically significant in Japan, the individual industry estimates are found to be about half positive and half negative, and only three of them have both the right sign and exceed their estimated standard error. For the United States, the results are only slightly better: seven out of the nine industries have positive R&D coefficients, and three of them are larger than their estimated standard errors. There is little relationship, moreover, in the relative size of these coefficients across the same industry groupings in the two countries (see lower panel of table 8.9).
We made several efforts to improve matters by redefining variables and 23. The higher capital elasticity estimate in Japan is consistent with the higher capital share in output reported by Jorgenson, Kuroda, and Nishimizu (1987) . ,066
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.220 (.00116) .25 1 (.00112) .265 (.00110) Note: Equations 3-5 contain an additional 13 industry dummy variables. Regression 5 includes also the average 1972-74 employment level as a control variable for initial size. Its coefficient is small, positive, and significant for the United States and essentially zero for Japan. MSE is the mean square error of regression residuals. =C/Z = growth rate of gross plant in constant prices per employee. bL = growth rate of employment. 'AWS = average R&D to sales ratio. R&D averaged for the years 1972-74, sales at mid-point of the period: geometric average of beginning-(1973) and end-period (1980) sales. Both variables are deflated. changing the time periods somewhat, but this had little effect. The results are quite robust to the use of net rather than gross physical capital measures or to changes in the averaging procedures for the R&D data. Changing time periods, however, makes more of a difference. Using the slightly shorter 1974-79 period improves the estimates somewhat in Japan but deteriorates them in the United States.24 This leads us to a disappointing finding: the instability of the productivity-R&D relationship and its sensitivity to the business cycle and macroeconomic supply shocks. Table 8 .10 presents annual estimates of the R&D coefficients using approximate total factor production (TFP) growth as the dependent variable. We use TFP here to avoid adding another source of variation, which would come from allowing also the physical capital elasticity to vary from year to year.25 What is striking is that, though the exact timing was a bit different, the oil shockinduced sharp recession of 1974-75 hit the R&D-intensive firms disproportionately hard in both countries. It is not clear, however, whether what we see in this table represents a real phenomenon or is just another reflection of the thinness of our data and our inability to estimate the effects of R&D precisely.26 24. About half the inflation during our seven-year study period of 1973-80 took place in the first year, 1973-74, and in the last one, 1979-80, as a consequence of the two oil shocks of 1973 and 1979. We thought that the potential errors in price deflators and hence in our productivity measures would thus be smaller for the shorter period 1974-79 and hoped for better results over this period.
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25. The estimated physical capital elasticity also varies from year to year. But since the growth in the capital-labor ratio and R&D intensity are nearly uncorrelated, the R&D coefficients are almost unaffected by the constraining of the capital coefficient implicit in the TFP equations.
26. Using average rates of growth over a number of years to estimate the relation of productivity to R&D has the advantage of minimizing the possible biases due to measurement errors and to the 
Tentative Conclusions
Japanese manufacturing firms spent about as much of their own money on R&D, relative to their sales, as did similar U.S. firms: about 1.9% versus 2.3%, respectively, in 1976. On the basis of the econometric analysis of our sample of R&D firms, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the contribution of these expenditures to productivity growth was about the same in both countries. There is no strong prima facie evidence for the hypothesis that differences in either the intensity or the fecundity of R&D expenditures can account for the rather large difference in the observed rates of growth of productivity between the two countries.27 The reasons for this difference must be looked for elsewhere.
We do find two important differences between Japan and the United States that help to account for some of this difference but require an explanation of their own:
1. In spite of their success in growing and exporting, Japanese firms reduced their employment levels significantly during this period while U.S. firms were increasing theirs. This alone is enough to account for the twice-faster growth timing problem. We expected, therefore, to find instability when looking at this relation on a single year basis, but not to such an extent. 27. Given the high standard errors associated with the Japanese estimates, it is not strong evidence against this hypothesis either. in the capital-labor ratio in Japanese manufacturing since the capital stock itself has been growing at roughly similar rates in both countries.
2. For reasons that are not well understood, the estimated effect of growth in the capital-labor ratio on firm productivity in manufacturing appears to be twice as large in Japan as in the United States. An exploration of the reasons for this difference awaits better data, another occasion, and perhaps a different approach to the problem.
There are a number of other puzzling findings that we hope to return to in the future: Why did the chemical industry perform so badly during this period in both countries? Why did the drug industry do so badly in the United States during these same years? Is this a real fact or an artifact of poor deflators? While the oil price shocks provide some explanation for the poor performance of the chemical firms along lines outlined by Bruno and Sachs (1985) , it is doubtful that they can also explain the experience of the pharmaceutical firms in the United States. Why does the effect of R&D intensity on productivity growth vary so much over the cycle? Is it because it should only be observable at or near full capacity? How can such considerations be incorporated into a more complete analysis of our data?
An improved analysis of the role of R&D expenditures in the growth of Japanese firms will require better data than are currently available to us. The Japanese Statistics Bureau has collected much more extensive and presumably more reliable data on R&D expenditures of firms for many years but as far as we know these data have not been accessible, nor have they been used in their detailed micro form. In the United States, similarly collected data by the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the Bureau of the Census have been matched for different surveys and brought together in a usable data file. The confidentiality problem was solved by performing all of the major data assembly and cleaning operations within the Census Bureau and by releasing only variance-covariance matrices for the major variables across firms and years without disclosing any individual firm information.28 It would certainly be interesting to launch a similar effort in Japan. Another way of dealing with the confidentiality requirement is to carry out the econometric analysis within the National Statistical Offices themselves, as was the case for our studies for France. 29 We cannot expect, however, that having better and more reliable data will solve all the problems. What we are looking for are effects that are at best variable, uncertain, and more or less long term in nature and that are also relatively small in magnitude. This does not mean, of course, that these effects are unimportant or that we should not devote more effort in trying to analyze them. But we cannot expect to account for much of the observed growth in productiv- Griliches (1980, 1986) and Griliches and Hall (1982) for more detail on these data and their construction and for results of analyses using them.
See
29. Since this was first written we have been informed that such efforts are indeed underway by researchers associated with the Economic Planning Agency in Japan. See Goto and Suzuki (1989) .
ity by focusing only on the firm's own R&D investments. The role of research spillovers between firms, sectors, and countries and the impact of other, less formal, ways of generating technical progress, are likely to be quite large and still remain to be measured.
Addendum
After the revision and completion of this paper for this volume, we gained access to new R&D information at the firm level for Japan. We are grateful to Fumio Hayashi for his help in getting these data.
Besides the R&D figures reported in the NEEDS data base and the official R&D survey of the Statistics Bureau of Japan, there exists in fact another R&D survey performed and published by the Nihon Keizai Shimbun Corporation in recent years. This survey is the source of the OECD numbers, which we already used to adjust the NEEDS figures for 18 of the largest R&D firms. In order to check our numbers on a larger scale, we matched these new data to our total sample of 1,032 firms for the fiscal year 1978 or 1979. We found 1,000 firms in common, among which 877 were reporting R&D expenditures. These 877 include our sample of 406 firms that reported R&D consistently from 1972 through 1980 in NEEDS and 471 firms that did not. When we compare the R&D numbers in the two sources for our 406 firms sample, the discrepancy is less than 5% for more than half of the sample; it is less than 50% for another quarter, but it is more than 400% for 48 firms. Contrary to the 18 large R&D adjusted firms, these 48 firms are smaller than average, and it is quite plausible that a major part of their R&D expenditures is external or cooperative and is not declared in NEEDS.
We have adjusted our R&D-intensity variable using the new R&D information (as we already had done with the OECD figures), and we have rerun our main regressions using these adjusted measures for various subsamples: the 406 R&D-reporting firms, among which we consider the 48 R&D-reporting firms with very large R&D discrepancies separately, and the remaining 358 R&D-reporting firms. We have also used the new R&D data for the 471 firms that did not report, or reported intermittently, R&D expenditures in NEEDS. Pooling together this sample and the previous ones, we have two overall samples of 877 (406 + 471) and 829 (358 + 471) firms. The results for the simplest regression (with constant returns to scale and without industry dummies, comparable to regression 2 in table 8.7) are given in table 8A. 1.
Using the adjusted R&D-intensity variable does not really improve our estimates. They remain about the same if the 48 firms for which the discrepancies are extreme are excluded, and they look worse if we do include them, the coefficient of R&D being smaller and not significant. Clearly one would like to know more about the 48 problematic firms. The estimates for the additional 471 firms sample and for the pooled 829 firms sample are also very similar to our previous results. .31 ~0 4 )
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On the whole these computations confirm our earlier results. This is reassuring since R&D expenditures are poorly reported in the NEEDS data bank. But it is also unfortunate since one would have hoped for somewhat stronger and more significant estimates with better and more accurate figures. Again the quality of the data is not our only problem.
